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reached an ‘agreement in principle’ on the ambitious 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 
December 2020. According to the European Commission, 
this is “the most ambitious agreement that China  
has ever concluded with a third country.” However,  
EU–China relations since plummeted due to sanctions 
and countersanctions over human rights issues. The 
European Commission and Parliament have put the 
agreement on ice, although its technical preparation 
and translation are still ongoing. It is improbable that 
the agreement will enter into force anytime soon. 
Nevertheless, considering the economic and geopolitical 
importance of the EU–China trade and investment 
relationship, this agreement deserves to be discussed  
in detail.
This Discussion Paper analyses the scope and contents 
of the CAI and explores the main challenges and 
opportunities for EU–China trade and investment 
relations.	It	first	dissects	and	discusses	the	key	features	
of the CAI: provisions on market access and investment 
liberalisation,	the	level	playing	field,	sustainable	
development, the institutional framework, and dispute 
settlement. Secondly, the CAI’s broader legal and political 
context is analysed, focusing on its lack of investor 
protection provisions, its potential to contribute to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) reform process, and its 
role in the triangular EU–US–China trade and investment 
relationship. Thirdly, the CAI’s link with the EU’s new 





The CAI is not a revolutionary agreement that will 
break open the Chinese market for EU investors. China’s 
market access commitments in the agreement mainly 
reflect	its	recent	or	planned	unilateral	foreign	investment	
liberalisation and only provide modest new market 
openings. However, this does not mean that the CAI 
has no added value, as it enshrines China’s unilateral 
liberalisation of foreign investment in an international 
treaty and can serve as a modest starting point for more 
ambitious rules at the bi- or multilateral (WTO) level.
Whether	the	CAI	would	make	a	significant	difference	
for EU investors will mainly depend on China’s 
implementation. Although its last Foreign Investment Law 
liberalised foreign investment further in several sectors, 
its recent adoption of a series of investment(-related) laws 
and policies targeting or restricting foreign investment 
does not bode well.
Regardless of whether the CAI will eventually be 
signed	and	ratified,	the	EU	must	continue	to	roll	out	
and implement its autonomous trade tools to address 
China’s trade-distortive practices. It must also use 
its (new) trade defence and enforcement tools when 
necessary. Moreover, it must prioritise transatlantic 
cooperation on WTO reform, proposing new rules that 
address the concerns vis-à-vis China it shares with the 
US and other like-minded countries.
As	long	as	China’s	countersanctions	against	EU	officials	
and entities are in place, the agreement should not be 
signed	and	ratified.	However,	if	these	diplomatic	tensions	
cool down, the EU must fully leverage the CAI and its 
trade and investment powers more generally to address 
the human rights and forced labour issues in China.
5
Introduction 
After seven years in the making, the EU and China 
finally	reached	an	‘agreement	in	principle’	on	the	
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 
December 2020. According to the European Commission, 
this is “the most ambitious agreement that China has 
ever concluded with a third country.”1 However, since 
then, EU–China relations plummeted due to sanctions 
and countersanctions over human rights issues. The 
Commission and European Parliament have put the 
agreement on ice, but its technical preparation and 
translation are still ongoing. It is improbable that the 
agreement will enter into force anytime soon. However, 
considering the economic and geopolitical importance of 
the EU–China trade and investment relationship, the CAI 
deserves to be discussed in detail.  
The European Commission and  
Parliament have put the CAI on ice,  
but its technical preparation and 
translation are still ongoing.
According to the European Commission, the CAI 
rebalances market access and binds China’s autonomous 
liberalisation of investment since it joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), thereby preventing 
backsliding. The Commission stressed that China agrees 
to new market access commitments in several service 
sectors. Finally, it claims that the CAI strengthens the 
level	playing	field	(LPF)	with	new	rules	on	state-owned	
enterprises (SOEs), subsidy transparency and forced 
technology transfers (FTTs), and includes important 
commitments to sustainable development.





China is the EU’s largest source of imports, third-largest 
trade partner, and third destination for EU exports after 
the	US	and	UK	–,	these	investment	flows	are	relatively	
underdeveloped. While the stock of Chinese FDI in the 
EU	has	grown	between	2008	and	2017	–	EU	FDI	in	China	
grew	from	€54	billion	to	€178	billion;	an	increase	of	
225% –, it remains relatively small.2 
A	reason	why	EU	FDI	flows	to	China	are	relatively	low	
is China’s restrictive FDI framework. Whereas the EU is 
open	to	FDI,	foreign	investors	in	China	face	significant	
restrictions, especially in service sectors. The EU’s 
2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook, which labelled China 
as a key partner for cooperation but also a “systemic 
rival” and a “strategic competitor”, highlighted how 
China’s	protectionist	measures	benefit	its	industrial	
champions. The measures shield them from competition 




domestic operators.3 Given this imbalance, the European 
Commission negotiated the CAI to improve the situation 
of its companies that (seek to) operate in China. 
However, as soon as the CAI was announced, it was 
immediately criticised for three essential reasons. First, 
the agreement arguably provides little new market access 
in	China,	as	it	mainly	codifies	China’s	recent	unilateral	
investment liberalisation efforts. Second, the CAI is 
critiqued	as	not	addressing	China’s	human	rights	abuses,	
such as the forced labour conditions of the Muslim 
Uyghur minority in the western region of Xinjiang, more 
strongly. Third, the Commission pushed the agreement 
through without consulting with the new Biden 
administration	first,	mainly	due	to	Germany’s	desire	to	
finish	its	EU	Presidency	with	diplomatic	success.	This	
has been raised as a missed opportunity to form a united 
transatlantic front against China. In the meantime, the 
CAI is even more in limbo following the EU’s and China’s 
respective sanctions and countersanctions over human 
rights issues (i.e. the latter’s treatment of the Uyghur 
minority) in March 2021.
Although the future of the CAI is highly uncertain, it 
remains a novelty in EU trade and investment policy. 
This sui generis agreement is not a traditional, ‘new-
generation’ EU free trade agreement (FTA), as it does not 
liberalise trade in goods and services (with a few notable 
exceptions for services). Nor does it include disciplines 
on non-tariff barriers, public procurement (PP) or 
intellectual property rights (IPR). It is not an investment 
agreement in the traditional sense, as it does not provide 
post-admission investment protection standards (e.g. 
fair	and	equitable	treatment	and	protection	against	
expropriation). Neither is it an investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) procedure, despite the EU initially 
envisaging it as such.  
This Discussion Paper analyses the scope and contents 
of the CAI and explores the main challenges and 
opportunities for EU–China trade and investment 
relations.	It	first	dissects	and	discusses	the	key	features	
of the CAI: provisions on market access and investment 
liberalisation, the LPF, sustainable development, 
the institutional framework, and dispute settlement. 
Secondly, the CAI’s broader legal and political context 
is analysed, focusing on its lack of investor protection 
provisions, its potential to contribute to the WTO reform 
process, and its role in the triangular EU–US–China 
trade and investment relationship. Thirdly, the CAI’s link 
with the EU’s new autonomous trade tools, sustainability 
and human rights dimension, and prospects for signature 
and	ratification	are	studied.
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1. Unpacking the Comprehensive Agreement  
on Investment
1.1. MARKET ACCESS AND INVESTMENT 
LIBERALISATION
Before	turning	to	the	CAI,	it	first	must	be	noted	that	
China has recently made selective reforms and sector-
specific	market	openings	based	on	its	Foreign	Investment	
Laws (FILs). China’s last FIL, in force since 1 January 
2020, marked an improvement because it shortened 
the ‘negative list’ of protected sectors in which foreign 
investment is restricted or prohibited.4 This means that, 
unless they fall within the sectors listed in the negative 
list, the latest FIL guarantees foreign investors and their 
investments	in	China	with	national	treatment	and	equal	
protection in their establishment and operation in China. 
The liberalised sectors include oil and gas, resource 
management,	and	trading	and	financial	services.	The	
FIL	removes	joint	venture	(JV)	requirements	for	certain	
sectors and prohibits (in principle) FTTs as a precondition 
for investment. The implementing rules for the FIL 
emphasise	the	equal	treatment	of	domestic	and	foreign-
invested	firms	with	regard	to	land	supply,	government	
procurement, licensing formalities and protecting 
intellectual property. The CAI binds this unilateral 
investment liberalisation and prevents backsliding to 
a large extent, while also creating some new market 
openings beyond China’s autonomous liberalisation.
Section II of the CAI, “Liberalisation of Investment”, 
includes obligations on market access, national treatment 
and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. It also 
contains	a	list	of	prohibited	‘performance	requirements’.	
One Party cannot impose these conditions on investors 
from the other Party in their territory, such as export 
obligations, obligations to buy local content, FTTs, or 
research and development (R&D) targets. Nationality 
requirements	concerning	‘senior	management	and	
board of directors’ are also prohibited. Some sectors are 
excluded from the CAI, such as audiovisual services, air 
transport services and PP. With regard to the entry and 
temporary stay of natural persons for business purposes 
(i.e. Mode 4 services of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Services), they are allowed to stay up to 90 days in a 
12-month period for establishment purposes (and up to 
3 years for managers and specialists) without restrictions 
(e.g.	labour	market	tests,	quotas).		 
China has recently made selective  
reforms and sector-specific market 
openings based on its Foreign  
Investment Laws.
Containing	both	Parties’	specific	commitments	and	
reservations, the CAI’s annexed schedules employ a 
hybrid approach. The CAI contains a negative listing 
for liberalisation commitments (i.e. national and MFN 
treatment,	performance	requirements).	This	means	that	
the EU and China commit not to discriminate across 
the	covered	sectors	(e.g.	not	impose	JV	requirements	or	
nationality	requirements)	unless	a	specific	reservation	
is included in the corresponding schedule. This implies 
that, in principle, new or future types of services will 
automatically be covered by the agreement. However, 
China’s Annex explicitly mentions that it reserves 
the right to impose investment restrictions on ‘new’ 
industries that the document does not cover. 
The binding of the liberalisation commitments is 
dynamic (i.e. ‘ratcheting’), which means that any future 
relaxation of the restrictive measures included in the 
schedules will be automatically bound. For market 
access commitments (i.e. the obligation to not impose 
quantitative	restrictions;	e.g.	limiting	the	number	
of licenses or branches, reserving monopoly rights, 
imposing economic needs test), the listing is positive. 
This means that both Parties’ commit not to impose 
quantitative	restrictions,	only	to	the	extent	that	the	
given sectors and the level of commitments are included 
in the relevant annexed schedules.  
The CAI binds several of China’s  
unilateral liberalisation commitments  
in the manufacturing sector, which  
makes up more than half of the EU’s 
investment in China.
The CAI binds several of China’s unilateral liberalisation 
commitments in the manufacturing sector, which makes 
up more than half of the EU’s investment in China (i.e. 
28% automotive sector, 22% basic materials). Annex III 
on China’s market access commitments and reservations 
illustrates that around 30 manufacturing sectors are 
being liberalised, most of them without any reservations 
like	JV	or	ownership	requirements.	These	sectors	include	
furniture manufacturing, rubber and plastic products, 
electrical	machinery	and	equipment,	computer	and	
communication	equipment,	food	processing,	apparel	and	
textiles, chemicals, and so on. Reservations only apply 
to	around	10	strategic	sectors,	reflecting	the	foreign	
investment restrictions enshrined in China’s recent 
FIL.	For	example,	it	is	still	prohibited	for	foreign	firms	
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to increase the production capacity of Chinese sectors 
characterised by overproduction (e.g. cement, steel,  
(non-ferrous)	metals,	aluminium,	transport	equipment).	
In other words, EU companies can still invest in these 
sectors	by,	for	example,	acquiring	a	Chinese	enterprise	 
but not increase the overall production capacity.
Several reservations apply to the automotive sector, 
which represents almost 30% of EU FDI in China. The CAI 
illustrates China’s ambition to promote the production 
of electric vehicles. It stipulates that the establishment of 
“new traditional fuel-powered motor vehicle enterprises” 
is prohibited. Increasing this sector’s production 
capacity is only allowed under strict conditions related 
to overcapacity. Instead, the CAI provides EU companies 
access to China’s electric vehicles sector. Establishing 
new production capacity in electric vehicles is allowed 
but subject to limitations related to overcapacity and 
competition with “existing independent investment 
projects”.5 However, to intensify cooperation in electric 
vehicles, these limitations do not apply to investment 
projects in pure electric vehicles by EU investors that 
amount above $1 billion.6 China will also lift several 
restrictions on foreign investment in this sector, such as a 
minimum	of	50%	Chinese	ownership	and	JV	requirements.	
This liberalisation was already foreseen in China’s 2020 
FIL and ‘negative list’. And in line with this FIL, the CAI’s 
reservations will only apply until 2022 – it is unlikely 
that the agreement will enter into force before then. This 
implies that EU enterprises could wholly own subsidiaries 
in the automotive sector, which is currently not the case 
(in principle). It should be mentioned, however, that some 
exceptions have already been made for BMW and Tesla.  
The CAI illustrates China’s  
ambition to promote the  
production of electric vehicles.
Regarding investment in services,	it	should	first	be	
recalled that China only made limited commitments 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
Mode 3 (commercial presence) when it joined the WTO. 
The real GATS-plus market opening created by the CAI 
can only be measured by comparing the agreement with 
China’s commitments under the GATS. Moreover, China 
liberalised several of its service sectors unilaterally 
through successive FILs. A detailed comparison is beyond 
the scope of this Discussion Paper. Nevertheless, it can 
be observed that China is making important GATS-plus 
commitments	in	the	area	of	services	(i.e.	financial,	real	
estate, environmental, computer, construction, auxiliary 
air transport and international maritime transport 
services),	particularly	by	lifting	JV	requirements.	For	
most service sectors covered by the CAI, no reservations 
apply with regard to market access (Annex III), although 
several national treatment reservations apply in most 
liberalised sectors (Annex II). For example, concerning 
financial	services,	the	CAI	prohibits	JV	requirements	and	
foreign	equity	caps	for	banking,	trading	securities	and	
insurance. China has agreed to lift the investment ban 
from cloud services, opening it to EU investors subject to a 
50%	equity	cap.	However,	EU	investors	are	still	prohibited	
from investing in internet access services. China will offer 
a new market opening in health services by lifting JV 
requirements	for	private	hospitals	in	key	Chinese	cities	
(although the majority of the medical personnel must still 
hold	Chinese	nationality).	JV	requirements	or	Chinese	
control	is	still	required	in	sectors	like	publishing	and	air	
transport. EU investors will still be (largely) prohibited 
from investing in sensitive sectors, such as the exploration 
or exploitation of raw materials, and postal services. 
Most of China’s market access commitments in the 
CAI do not create new investment opportunities for EU 
investors in China, as they essentially codify existing or 
envisaged unilateral market access commitments under 
its recent FILs. For instance, China has already started 
to	remove	JV	requirements	from	the	financial	and	health	
sector, allowed 50% foreign ownership in cloud services 
since 2019, and began liberalising investments without 
JVs for electric and hybrid vehicles in 2018. The value of 
the CAI is that it locks in these commitments. Moreover, 
China’s commitments and openings in service sectors 
will	benefit	not	only	the	EU	but	also	all	other	WTO	
members by virtue of MFN rules (GATS Article II). 
1.2. THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
The CAI aims to create a fair(er) LPF by including rules 
on SOEs, subsidy transparency, FTTs, and standard-
setting and transparency.
1.2.1. State-owned enterprises
One of the EU’s greatest concerns about China’s 
investment and trade regime relates to the competitive 
distortive effects caused by its SOEs. WTO agreements do 
not, in principle, forbid SOEs (provided that they operate 
on a commercial basis), and SOEs are not covered in 
great detail in China’s WTO accession protocol. The CAI 
is one of the few agreements concluded by China that 
covers disciplines on SOEs, although its WTO accession 
protocol does state that they “would make purchases 
and sales based solely on commercial considerations”.7 
The	CAI	gives	a	precise	and	comprehensive	definition	of	
SOEs, covering entities where the state holds the direct 
or indirect power to control decisions through minority 
ownership and/or to appoint the management body, 
and state-designated monopolies or entities vested with 
special rights or privileges.  
The EU would need to rely on China’s 
goodwill to provide sensitive information 
on its state-owned enterprises.
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The	agreement	requires	SOEs	to	act	in	accordance	with	
commercial considerations and not discriminate in 
their purchases and sales of goods and/or services. This 
implies that Chinese SOEs cannot discriminate against 
goods or services supplied by EU investors or favour 
Chinese goods and services. Notably, a footnote in the 
CAI	specifies	that	this	commitment	does	not	apply	to	EU	
firms	with	no	commercial	presence	in	China.	A	specific	
transparency mechanism provides that the Parties may 
request	information	about	a	SOE	of	the	other	Party	
if it believes that its interests are being “adversely 
affected by the commercial activities” of said SOE.8 
This information can include details about the Party’s 
ownership and voting and management structure of the 
enterprise, or the latter’s annual revenue, total assets 
or exemptions under domestic law and regulations. 
There is, however, no strict obligation to reply to these 
requests,	which	means	that	the	EU	would	need	to	rely	
on China’s goodwill to provide sensitive information 
on	its	SOEs.	Moreover,	there	is	no	specific	requirement	
to notify subsidises to (or by) SOEs, although a general 
notification	mechanism	does	exist	(see	section	1.2.2.).	
1.2.2. Subsidies 
The lack of transparency and unfair competition of 
Chinese subsidies is another major EU concern that the 
CAI addresses. The agreement goes beyond WTO rules 
as it also includes transparency obligations for subsidies 
in	the	service	sectors.	Both	Parties	will	be	required	to	
publish promptly (i.e. within the calendar year after the 
subsidy being granted) details of the subsidies covered 
by the agreement (e.g. objective, form, budget size, 
recipient). The CAI also obliges both Parties to engage in 
consultations to share additional information on subsidies 
that could negatively affect investment interests. The 
requesting	Party	may	ask	for	additional	information	about	
the subsidy (e.g. the amount). However, a Party cannot be 
forced to remove such a subsidy. It is only obliged to “use 
its	best	endeavours	to	find	a	solution”.9 
It remains to be seen whether these soft commitments 
will	suffice.	China’s	track	record	on	timely	compliance	and	
quality	of	subsidy	notification	is	already	proving	to	be	poor.	
The EU and other WTO members consistently criticise 
China’s failure to notify its possible subsidy programmes in 
sectors like steel and aluminium to the WTO’s Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.10  
China’s track record on timely compliance 
and quality of subsidy notification is 
already proving to be poor.
The CAI clearly intends to improve subsidy transparency. 
It does not, however, create new disciplines on 
prohibited subsidies. Moreover, the enforcement 
of its subsidy rules is weak, as disputes about these 
provisions are not actionable under its dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM). Therefore, at best, the 
European	Commission	can	use	the	improved	notification	
requirements	to	launch	anti-subsidy	duties	or	WTO	
cases. Nonetheless, it appears that the EU aims to use 
its autonomous trade tools (e.g. its envisaged Foreign 
Subsidy	Instrument;	see	section	2.5.)	and	multilateral	
negotiations on subsidies at the WTO level or from 
the trilateral talks with Japan and the US to address 
the trade-distortive effects of China’s subsidies (see 
section 2.2.). The CAI anticipates the possible outcome 
of future WTO discussions on subsidies. Depending 
on the progress and possible outcome of these WTO 
discussions, the EU and China may adopt a decision by 
the relevant joint committee to update these provisions. 
1.2.3. Forced technology transfers
Another long-standing concern for the EU and other 
foreign enterprises operating in China relates to China’s 
FTT	requirements	(in	the	areas	of	e.g.	electric	vehicles,	
biotechnology). The EU already challenged these 
practices before the WTO, arguing that they violate 
China’s WTO accession protocol.11 However, China 
recently prohibited FTTs in its 2020 FIL (in principle). 
The	CAI	codifies	this	commitment	by	forbidding	the	
imposition of technology transfers, production processes 
or other proprietary knowledge on other Party’s 
investors	(e.g.	the	requirement	to	transfer	technology	to	
a JV partner). The agreement also prohibits the Parties 
from interfering in contractual freedom of technology 
licencing. Similar disciplines on FTTs are included in the 
US–China Phase 1 trade deal.
Regarding domestic regulation, the CAI incorporates 
provisions	equivalent	to	those	currently	under	
negotiation in the context of the plurilateral WTO 
Agreement on Services Domestic Regulation. The CAI 
provides	that	licensing	and	qualification	requirements	
and procedures must be transparent and reasonable 
and prevent barriers to investment. It also states that 
investors	from	the	other	Party	will	be	given	equal	access	
to	standard-setting	bodies	–	a	long-standing	request	
of EU industry. Finally, it also includes transparency 
rules on regulatory and administrative measures to 
enhance legal certainty and predictability and on 
procedural fairness and the right to judicial review (i.e. 
in competition cases). The EU and China are discussing 
similar rules in the WTO in the context of a plurilateral 
agreement on investment facilitation.
1.3. INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The CAI includes a chapter on “Investment and 
Sustainable Development” (ISD), which is similar to 
the EU’s standard approach to Trade and Sustainable 
Development (TSD) chapters in its recent FTAs. 
In the areas of labour and environment, both Parties 
commit not to lower the standards of protection to 
attract investment, not to use labour and environment 
standards for protectionist purposes, and to respect its 
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international obligations in the relevant treaties. It also 
includes a standard provision on the right to regulate, 
confirming	that	each	Party	remains	free	to	determine	
its sustainable development policies and priorities, 
establish its levels of domestic labour and environmental 
protection, and adopt or modify its relevant laws and 
policies accordingly. The EU and China will support their 
companies’ uptake of corporate social responsibility.
Importantly, the CAI also includes commitments on 
the environment and climate, including effectively 
implementing the multilateral environmental 
agreements to which it is a signatory (i.e. the Paris 
Agreement and its Nationally Determined Contributions). 
The EU and China shall also facilitate and encourage 
investment in environmental goods and services.
China	also	commits	to	effectively	implement	its	ratified	
International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 
and work towards ratifying its outstanding fundamental 
Conventions. Regarding forced labour, China “shall make 
continued and sustained efforts on its own initiative to 
pursue	ratification	of	the	fundamental	ILO	Conventions	
No 29 and 105” (both on forced labour).12 These 
commitments are important, considering the concerns 
of European civil society and several Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) about China’s human rights 
abuses (e.g. forced labour conditions of the Muslim 
Uyghur	minority;	see	section	2.4.).
Similar to the other TSD chapters in EU FTAs, disputes 
under this chapter are exempted from the general DSM 
(which can lead to the suspension of trade preferences 
in the case of non-compliance). Instead, they rely on 
a weaker mechanism that involves monitoring by and 
consultation between the Parties, and a report by a 
panel of experts. However, contrary to the TSD chapters 
in recent EU FTAs, the CAI does not provide for the 
involvement of civil society through Domestic Advisory 
Groups. Civil society organisations are only allowed to 
deliver, under certain conditions, unsolicited written 
submissions to the panel of experts (i.e. amicus curiae 
submissions). At the same time, the CAI stipulates that 
the expert panel is not obliged to address any of the 
arguments	made	in	such	submissions.	A	specific	working	
group will monitor the implementation of this chapter.
1.4. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND 
INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
For disputes concerning the interpretation and 
application of the CAI’s provisions, the agreement 
establishes a standard state-to-state DSM, like those 
included	in	all	recent	EU	FTAs.	This	procedure	first	
provides consultation mechanisms (and the possibility 
to mediate) to reach a mutually agreed solution. In the 
absence of a solution, recourse to an arbitration panel 
procedure is possible (which can lead to the suspension 
of preferences in case of non-compliance with the panel 
report). Whereas state-to-state DSMs under EU FTAs 
were initially hardly used, the European Commission is 
increasingly relying on these procedures in the context 
of its more ‘assertive’ trade policy that focuses on 
enforcing bi- and multilateral trade rules (e.g. recently 
under FTAs with Ukraine, the Southern African Customs 
Union, Algeria). 
The EU and China remain free to have recourse to the 
WTO DSM instead, to challenge a measure covered by 
the CAI. However, this would prevent the Parties from 
being able to also rely on the CAI DSM. The WTO dispute 
settlement process will remain an important avenue 
for EU–China trade dispute resolution, considering 
that the latter is using this system increasingly since it 
joined the WTO, both as complainant and respondent. In 
fact,	it	is	now	one	of	the	most	prolific	users	of	the	WTO	
dispute settlement process and has a good track record of 
complying with ‘lost’ WTO cases. The EU’s ongoing WTO 
cases with China concern technology transfer measures 
and raw materials on the offensive side, and anti-dumping 
and feed-in-tariff measures on the defensive side.13 
The WTO dispute settlement process  
will remain an important avenue for  
EU–China trade dispute resolution, 
considering that the latter is using  
this system increasingly since it  
joined the WTO, both as complainant  
and respondent.
The CAI also established an institutional framework, 
including an Investment Committee that will be co-
chaired by a European Commissioner and a Chinese Vice-
Premier at the highest level. The Committee will meet 
yearly and is tasked with ensuring the proper functioning 
of the CAI and adopting any necessary measures, 
including binding interpretations of the provisions. 
All decisions shall be taken by consensus and bind the 
Parties. A working group on investment, which the EU 
Director-General for Trade and the Chinese Vice-Minister 
of Commerce will co-chair, shall meet every six months.
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2. The broader context of EU–China trade and 
investment relations 
2.1. QUID INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT?
Although the CAI is an investment agreement, it does 
not cover substantive investment protection standards 
like monetary compensation for (in)direct expropriation 
and	fair	and	equitable	treatment.	Nor	does	it	include	
ISDS mechanisms that are typically included in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). This is remarkable, as the EU 
initially envisaged an investment protection agreement 
to replace the 25 different BITs that all the EU member 
states barring Ireland have with China. These BITs, 
which will remain in place, are hardly used by EU 
investors in China, arguably because EU companies fear 
Chinese retaliation against their investments or (future) 
activities in China.14
However, the CAI includes a commitment by both 
Parties to pursue the negotiations on investment 
protection and investment dispute settlement within 
two years of signing. The common objective is to work 
towards modernised investment protection standards 
and a dispute settlement that accounts for the work 
undertaken by the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group III on ISDS 
reform. The Commission proposes replacing traditional 
ISDS mechanisms in UNCITRAL with a ‘Multilateral 
Investment Court’ (MIC). Moreover, the EU has recently 
concluded investment protection standards, including 
its new bilateral Investment Court System (ICS), in its 
agreements with Canada (Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement), Vietnam and Singapore (Investment 
Protection Agreements).15  
China’s position on ISDS reform and  
the EU’s proposals remains unclear.
China’s position on ISDS reform and the EU’s proposals 
remains	unclear.	It	confirmed	in	a	submission	to	the	
UNCITRAL process that it is “open to possible proposals 
for improving the ISDS mechanism.”16 Moreover, several 
(but not all) of its proposals are similar to the EU’s 
proposal for a MIC. It remains to be seen whether China 
will commit to negotiating a bilateral ICS with the 
EU, particularly as it is developing its own system for 
investment disputes in the context of, for example, its 
Belt and Road Initiative. 
2.2. A STEPPINGSTONE FOR WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION REFORM? 
The CAI must be considered in the broader context 
of the triangular EU–US–China trade and investment 
relationship, and the EU’s proposals for WTO reform. 
WTO reform is one of the key priorities of the EU’s new 
trade strategy, as the European Commission intends to 
pursue it across all its functions – particularly its DSM 
and ‘rulebook’.17 Concerning the modernisation of the 
WTO rulebook, several of the Commission’s proposals for 
reform aim to address the EU’s concerns about China’s 
trade-distortive practices, especially the proposed rules 
on state intervention and competitive neutrality like 
subsidies, SOEs and FTTs.18 
The CAI includes several provisions and commitments 
that go beyond WTO agreements and China’s WTO 
accession	protocol.	A	few	specific	elements	of	the	CAI	
have the potential to nudge China to engage in the 
WTO reform process on rules on state intervention, 
competitive neutrality and other areas. For example, 
the Commission’s most recent WTO reform proposal, 
annexed to the new EU trade strategy, states the 
following: “New international SOE rules should focus on 
the behaviour of SOEs in their commercial activities, in 
line with the disciplines already agreed in several free 
trade and investment agreements.”19 
As noted above, the CAI’s provisions on SOEs already 
include commitments that go in this direction (e.g. the 
requirement	to	act	based	on	commercial	considerations	
and non-discrimination commitments). Moreover, the 
CAI’s disciplines on FTTs can trigger corresponding  
rules at the WTO level, particularly as the US–China 
Phase 1 agreement also includes disciplines on this issue. 
In addition, the CAI’s provisions on domestic regulation 
and transparency (Section III on Regulatory Framework) 
can boost the plurilateral WTO initiatives to establish 
an Investment Facilitation Agreement and Services 
Domestic Regulation.  
The CAI’s rules on subsidies are still  
a far cry from the EU’s proposals for  
WTO reform.
The CAI does not pave the way to more ambitious WTO 
rules in other crucial areas. For example, the CAI’s rules 
on subsidies are still a far cry from the EU’s proposals 
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for WTO reform. The Commission aims to increase the 
WTO’s	transparency	requirements	regarding	subsidies	
and envisages establishing additional categories of 
prohibited subsidies, as well as categories of subsidies 
presumed to be injurious. Together with discussions on 
such ‘red’ and ‘amber’ boxes, the Commission is also 
considering a ‘green box’ that includes subsidies that 
support legitimate public goals while having minimal 
trade-distortive impacts (e.g. environmental and R&D 
subsidies). The CAI does not contribute to the realisation 
of these proposals, as it essentially only focuses on 
transparency	requirements	and	lacks	new	disciplines	on	
prohibited subsidies. 
Moreover, the proposal on industrial subsidies in 
the EU–US–Japan trilateral talks goes even further. 
The three parties proposed adding four new types of 
prohibited subsidies that Article 3(1) of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures covers. 
These	consist	of	(i)	unlimited	guarantees;	(ii)	subsidies	
for insolvent or ailing enterprises, in the absence of a 
credible	restructuring	plan;	(iii)	subsidies	for	enterprises	
unable	to	obtain	long-term	financing	or	investment	from	
independent commercial sources when those enterprises 
operate	in	industries	plagued	by	overcapacity;	and	
(iv) certain direct forgiveness of debt. Other harmful 
subsidies, such as excessively harmful subsidies or 
subsidies	that	prop	up	uncompetitive	firms,	would	also	
be prohibited in principle. 
Furthermore, the trilateral’s proposal is much more 
ambitious	than	the	CAI	with	regard	to	the	notification	
of subsidies. The trilateral proposal states that when a 
subsidising WTO member does not notify but another 
member counter-notifies	the	measure,	the	former’s	
subsidy	will	be	treated	as	prohibited	unless	the	required	
information is provided within a short deadline. The CAI 
does not nudge China in this direction but does leave the 
door open to an update if the WTO were to establish new 
rules on subsidies. 
So far, neither the EU nor the US managed 
to extract more ambitious disciplines on 
subsidies from China in their respective 
bilateral agreements.
Considering the EU’s ambition for a renewed EU–US 
partnership under the Biden administration, the 
Commission is prioritising transatlantic cooperation  
on WTO reform.20 It envisages addressing shared 
concerns vis-à-vis China in the WTO reform process, 
such as on China’s subsidies and SOEs, jointly with  
the US. So far, neither the EU nor the US managed  
to extract more ambitious disciplines on subsidies  
from China in their respective bilateral agreements. 
The US–China Phase 1 agreement does not cover strict 
rules on subsidies nor SOEs (but does include disciplines 
on FTTs and IPR). Therefore, the Commission aims 
to intensify its engagement with the US, to launch 
negotiations on the development of rules on competitive 
neutrality, including modernised rules on industrial 
subsidies, in the run-up to the 12th WTO Ministerial 
Conference (MC12). The Commission can build further 
on the work on industrial subsidies established in the 
trilateral format with Japan, broadening its scope and 
membership with like-minded countries.  
On	the	other	hand,	the	EU	could	find	a	partner	in	
China for its proposals to modernise the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) and its stalled Appellate Body 
(AB). The Commission recognises several of the US’ 
concerns on the DSB and AB (e.g. the duration of the 
procedure and certain adjudicative approaches of the 
AB), addressing them in its WTO reform proposals.21 
Whereas the Biden administration is yet to take a stance 
on this issue, China has already aligned itself with the 
EU’s proposals and is, contrary to the US, a member of 
the WTO multi-party interim appeal arrangement. 
2.3. THE EU’S AUTONOMOUS TRADE 
INSTRUMENTS
The CAI is the EU’s bilateral instrument with China 
to rebalance market access and create a better LPF. 
However, in parallel with this bilateral approach, the 
EU is also strengthening its autonomous trade toolbox 
to deal with unfair trade practices, especially those 
caused by China. Under the umbrella of ‘Open Strategic 
Autonomy’, the EU’s new trade policy aims to tackle 
unfair trade practices more assertively and will focus 
more on the implementation and enforcement of trade 
rules – ensuring a fair LPF.22 The Commission’s new Chief 
Trade	Enforcement	Officer	will	be	responsible	for	rolling	
out and implementing these tools. In this context, the 
EU has recently adopted or proposes several autonomous 
trade instruments that target China’s distortive trade and 
investment practices (indirectly) and would complement 
the CAI. These instruments are outlined below. 
The EU is also strengthening its 
autonomous trade toolbox to deal  
with unfair trade practices, especially  
those caused by China.
2.3.1. Foreign investment screening
In October 2020, the EU’s foreign investment screening 
framework became fully operational (Regulation (EU) 
2019/452). This instrument came against the backdrop of 
growing concerns on Chinese investment in key sectors 
related to cutting-edge technologies. This framework 
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sets up a mechanism between the European Commission 
and EU member states to cooperate and exchange 
information on investments from non-EU countries that 
may affect security or public order. Around 15 EU member 
states currently have an investment screening in place, 
and most are developing or updating such mechanisms.23 
 
China adopted, partially as a reaction to 
the EU’s foreign investment screening 
framework, its own new investment 
screening mechanism in January 2021.
China adopted, partially as a reaction to the EU’s 
framework, its own new investment screening mechanism 
in January 2021. Although both Parties’ instruments 
are	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	CAI’s	objectives	(i.e.	
investment facilitation), they are nevertheless allowed 
under its national security exception.
2.3.2. International Procurement Instrument
The CAI does not cover PP. The EU has opened its PP 
markets to third countries to a large degree, including 
through the revised WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA). However, China has still not 
committed to opening up its PP market – it is not a 
member of the GPA –, and EU companies are still largely 
excluded from China’s PP markets. 
In view of this, the Commission aims to relaunch 
interinstitutional negotiations on an International 
Procurement Instrument (IPI). Amended in 2016, the IPI 
proposal would enable the Commission to investigate 
allegations of discrimination against EU parties in 
foreign PP markets. In addition, it would allow the 
Commission to consult with the third country concerned 
to obtain reciprocal concessions on the latter’s PP 
market. As a last resort, the proposal foresees the 
imposition of a price penalty on tenders originating 
in the third country concerned. Member states remain 
deeply divided over this issue, and the Council is still 
blocking the IPI – Germany is a key opponent. 
Both the Commission’s 2019 Strategic Outlook on 
China and 2021 trade strategy calls on the Council to 
finalise	the	IPI.	Although	this	instrument	was	originally	
intended to break open PP markets in China and other 
Asian countries, the Biden administration’s strong 
emphasis on ‘Buy American’ seems to be the catalyst to 
break the deadlock in the EU. Member states and MEPs 
are increasingly concerned that EU companies will be 
excluded (further) from American PP contracts due to 
these Buy American recovery policies. In this context, 
trilogue negotiations on the IPI were relaunched in 
April 2021, and the Portuguese Presidency is expected to 
present a compromise text before July. 
2.3.3. Foreign subsidies instrument
The CAI’s provisions on subsidies deal primarily with 
transparency and establish a consultation mechanism  
(see section 1.2.2.). In order to deal with the trade-
distortive effects in the Single Market caused by subsidies 
granted by Chinese and other third countries to companies 
in the EU, the Commission adopted its proposal for a 
foreign subsidies instrument in May 2021, alongside its 
new industrial strategy. This instrument aims to close the 
regulatory gap in the Single Market, as EU competition 
rules do not cover foreign subsidies that provide an unfair 
advantage	when	acquiring	EU	companies,	participating	in	
EU PP, or engaging in other commercial activities in the EU. 
The	proposed	regulation	establishes	notification-
based tools to allow the Commission to investigate 
concentrations	(i.e.	acquisitions)	and	bids	in	PP	that	
involve	non-EU	financial	contributions	above	certain	
thresholds. In addition, a general market investigation 
tool will enable the Commission to investigate 
other	types	of	market	situations,	such	as	greenfield	
investments or concentrations and procurements, when 
it suspects that a foreign subsidy may be involved. If the 
Commission establishes that a foreign subsidy exists, 
is distortive and has negative effects, it can impose far-
reaching redressive measures or commitments. These 
essentially combine the Commission’s enforcement 
competences and investigatory powers under the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 and EU state aid rules. For example, 
the Commission would be able to impose a range of 
structural or behavioural remedies, such as divesting 
certain assets, reducing capacity or market presence, or 
prohibiting a certain market behaviour. It would also 
have	the	power	to	prohibit	the	subsidised	acquisition	
or PP contract from being awarded to the subsidised 
bidder. Like under EU competition law, the Commission 
would have the right to conduct on-site inspection visits 
and	impose	fines	on	non-cooperative	undertakings.	
The European Parliament and Council will discuss the 
proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
2.3.4. Other trade defence and enforcement tools
The EU is developing other new tools to deal with unfair 
trade practices by China and other third countries. 
The EU has updated its enforcement regulation to 
strengthen its capacity to act in situations in which 
dispute settlement under WTO or bilateral agreements is 
blocked	(Regulation	2021/167).	Moreover,	later	this	year,	
the Commission will propose a new trade instrument to 
protect the EU from third countries’ coercive actions. The 
envisaged anti-coercion instrument would empower 
the	Commission,	in	specific	situations	of	coercion,	to	take	
trade, investment or other restrictive measures towards 
the non-EU country exerting the pressure. 
Finally, the Commission will keep relying on its 
traditional trade defence instruments. Case in point, 
China was already the main target of the amended anti-
dumping	and	-subsidy	rules	in	2017	and	2018.	Most	of	
the EU’s anti-dumping and -subsidy measures concern 
imports from China, which, after the US, is the second-
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biggest user of trade defence instruments that target the 
EU (around 20 measures).24
2.4. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
European civil society and MEPs strongly criticise 
the CAI’s provisions on sustainable development, 
particularly in relation to forced labour and human 
rights more generally. Over the past year, China has 
faced mounting condemnation – including from the EU 
and the US – over the internment of Uyghurs and other 
ethnic minority groups in forced labour camps, mainly 
in the far-western region of Xinjiang. 
The scope of the ISD chapter has been criticised as being 
too limited and its enforcement mechanisms too weak. 
As noted above, disputes under this chapter are exempted 
from the general DSM and rely instead on a weaker 
mechanism that involves consultation and an expert 
panel. Regarding forced labour, the CAI obliges China 
to “make continued and sustained efforts on its own 
initiative	to	pursue	ratification	of	the	fundamental	ILO	
Conventions No 29 and 105”.25 Several MEPs have already 
stated	that	China’s	ratification	and	implementation	





that these commitments are legally binding and should 
be respected regardless of their effect on trade.26 
The European Commission stresses  
that the CAI is not the only instrument 
in the EU’s trade and sustainable 
development toolbox to deal with 
sustainable development and human 
rights concerns in China.
In its new trade strategy, the Commission promised 
a comprehensive review of its 15-point plan on 
implementing and enforcing TSD chapters effectively 
by mid-2021. However, the Commission stated that 
this review would only feed into ongoing and future 
FTA negotiations, implying that this exercise would not 
change the text of the CAI. It stresses that the CAI is not 
the only instrument in the EU’s TSD toolbox to deal with 
sustainable development and human rights concerns 
in	China.	The	agreement	will	be	flanked	by	other	
autonomous tools to address these concerns, including 
the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (see section 
2.5.) and the new Single Entry Point that would allow all 
EU-based stakeholders to lodge TSD-related complaints. 
Moreover, the Commission will submit a proposal on 
mandatory due diligence, including effective action and 
enforcement mechanisms, to ensure that forced labour 
does	not	find	a	place	in	the	value	chains	of	EU	companies.	 
2.5. SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION  
The European Commission and China are working 
towards	finalising	the	text	of	the	CAI	(i.e.	legal	
scrubbing). It will need to be legally reviewed and 
translated before it can be submitted for approval to  
the Council and the European Parliament. 
The Commission must still determine whether it will 
propose the CAI as an ‘EU-only agreement’ or ‘mixed 
agreement’.	In	the	latter	case,	all	27	EU	member	states	
would also need to sign and ratify the agreement, leading 
to	a	long	and	unpredictable	ratification	procedure.	
Considering that the CAI does not cover provisions on 
ISDS – which does not fall under the EU’s exclusive 
competences, as recently ruled by the Court of Justice 
in Opinion 2/15 –, it is likely that the Commission will 
propose it as an EU-only agreement. Therefore, it is also 
unlikely that the Commission will propose to apply the 
agreement provisionally after the signature and before 
the	ratification	by	the	Council	and	European	Parliament.	 
The Commission must still determine 
whether it will propose the CAI as an  
‘EU-only agreement’ or ‘mixed agreement’.
The Commission initially envisaged submitting the CAI 
to the Council and European Parliament for signature and 
ratification	in	the	second	half	of	2021.	However,	in	March	
2021,	China	adopted	several	sanctions	against	EU	officials	
and entities in reaction to the EU’s Global Human Rights 
Sanctions Regime, condemning several Chinese persons 
and entities for human rights abuses, including those 
committed against China’s Uyghur minority. 
Several MEPs have already stated that the Parliament 
will	not	even	put	the	ratification	of	the	CAI	on	its	agenda	
as long as these sanctions apply against the MEPs. 
Being	that	these	Chinese	sanctions	against	EU	officials	
and entities are in place, it is also unlikely that the 
Commission will propose the agreement. Moreover, as 
noted, several MEPs have already stated that they aim 
to	condition	the	European	Parliament’s	ratification	of	
the	CAI	to	China’s	implementation	and	ratification	of	
the two fundamental ILO Conventions on forced labour. 
In addition, several MEPs have already voiced that they 
would	prefer	first	to	have	the	different	new	autonomous	
trade tools (e.g. Foreign Subsidy Instrument, IPI, anti-
coercion instrument) and TSD instruments (e.g. due 
diligence scheme) in place to deal with China’s unfair 
trade practices before ratifying the CAI. 
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These	positions	were	confirmed	on	20	May	2021	when	the	
Parliament adopted a resolution with an overwhelming 
majority that “[c]ondemns in the strongest possible 
terms the baseless and arbitrary sanctions imposed by 
the Chinese authorities”. The Parliament has put the CAI 
on ice, as it takes the position “that any consideration of 
the	[CAI],	as	well	as	any	discussion	on	ratification	by	the	
European	Parliament,	has	justifiably	been	frozen	because	
of the Chinese sanctions in place” and demands that 
“China lift the sanctions before Parliament can deal with 
the	CAI,	without	prejudice	to	the	final	outcome	of	the	CAI	
ratification	process”.	The	Parliament	also	highlights	the	
urgent need to rebalance EU–China relations by adopting 
the EU’s autonomous trade tools.27 
In response to the rapidly deteriorating political climate, 
EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis stated on 
4 May that the EU “for the moment suspended some 
efforts to raise political awareness on the part of the 
Commission”. It is “clear that in the current situation, 
with the EU sanctions in place against China and Chinese 
counter-sanctions in place, including against members of 
the European Parliament (that) the environment is not 
conducive	for	ratification	of	the	agreement”.28 Whereas 
technical aspects like legal scrubbing are still ongoing, 
the Commission will clearly not propose the CAI for 
signature	and	ratification	unless	the	political	climate	
improves and China’s sanctions against MEPs are lifted.
Conclusion and recommendations 
The CAI is not a revolutionary agreement that will break 
open the Chinese market for EU investors. China’s market 
access	commitments	in	the	CAI	mainly	reflect	its	recent	
or planned unilateral foreign investment liberalisation 
and only provide modest new market openings. 
However, this does not mean that the CAI has no added 
value, as it enshrines China’s unilateral liberalisation 
of foreign investment in an international treaty – 
preventing backsliding and providing for enforcement 
procedures (although provisions on investment 
protection are still lacking).  Moreover, the CAI includes 
new rules on transparency for subsidies, SOEs, FTTs, 
domestic regulation and transparency, all of which relate 
to the EU’s key concerns about China’s distortive trade 
and investment practices. Several of these provisions 
are	still	insufficient	or	not	strongly	enforceable	(e.g.	
provisions on subsidies and SOEs). Nevertheless, some 
(but not all) CAI disciplines can serve as a modest 
starting point for more ambitious rules at the bi- or 
multilateral (WTO) level. 
Whether	the	CAI	would	make	a	significant	difference	
for EU investors would mainly depend on China’s 
implementation of the agreement within the context of its 
domestic and external economic and investment policies. 
Although China’s last FIL liberalised foreign investment 
further in several sectors, its recent adoption of a series 
of investment(-related) laws and policies targeting or 
restricting foreign investment does not bode well. For 
example, in less than two years, China has updated its law 
on (security) screening of foreign investment, adopted 
a new export control law and a statute to block the 
extraterritorial effect of foreign legislation and measures, 
drawn up a list of ‘unreliable entities’ to punish foreign 
enterprises deemed harmful to China’s sovereignty and 
security, and enacted a series of security-related laws (e.g. 
the Cybersecurity Law) which restrict or complicate the 
Chinese business climate for EU companies.
These tools align with China’s state-sponsored industrial 
strategy, Made in China 2025, which aims to reduce the 
country’s reliance on foreign technology in several strategic 
high-tech	sectors;	and	its	new	‘dual	circulation’	economic	
model. With the latter, China aims to cut its dependence 
on overseas markets and technology, mainly due to its 
trade	conflict	with	the	US	under	the	Trump	administration.	
China is seeking to abandon its export-oriented economic 
model and move towards a more inward-looking and 
self-reliant development strategy by building up its high-
tech capacity through state intervention and inward 
investment.29 This may explain why China agreed to a deal 
that offers little new access for Chinese investors to the EU 
but facilitates EU investment in China in several strategic 
sectors (e.g. electronic vehicles). 
China aims to cut its dependence  
on overseas markets and technology, 
mainly due to its trade conflict with  
the US under the Trump administration.
Regardless of whether the CAI will eventually be signed 
and	ratified	(although	it	currently	looks	unlikely),	
the EU must continue to roll out and implement 
its autonomous trade tools that address China’s 
trade-distortive practices (e.g. Foreign Subsidies 
Instrument, IPI). It should use its (new) trade defence 
and enforcement tools when necessary (e.g. the new 
enforcement regulation, anti-coercion mechanism, 
traditional trade defence instruments). The Commission 
should not back away from applying these instruments 
in a targeted, proportionate and WTO-compatible way, 
even if it leads to more counteractions from China (e.g. 
new investment restrictions, suspension of the CAI). 
If China takes its envisaged dual circulation model 
seriously, the Commission will arguably need to focus 
more on protecting EU investors in China from unfair 
competition or practices than on dealing with unfair 
Chinese investments in the EU Single Market. 
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If China takes its envisaged dual 
circulation model seriously, the European 
Commission will arguably need to focus 
more on protecting EU investors in China 
from unfair competition or practices 
than on dealing with unfair Chinese 
investments in the EU Single Market.
In parallel, the EU must prioritise transatlantic 
cooperation on WTO reform, proposing new rules that 
address the concerns vis-à-vis China (e.g. subsidies, 
FTTs, SOEs) it shares with the US and other like-minded 
countries. The EU and the US can build on the progress 
made in the trilateral format with Japan and should 
set these WTO reforms in motion at the MC12 later 
this year. However, it will be important to also engage 
China – the subject of concern – in these talks as soon as 
possible to avoid Beijing condemning the WTO reform 
process as an ‘anti-China exercise’. A new patchwork of 
WTO plurilateral agreements on competitive neutrality 
without China’s participation will do little for the 
sustainability of the multilateral trading system. 
Considering the current political and diplomatic tensions 
between the EU and China, triggered by the recent 
(counter)sanctions, it is unlikely that the European 
Commission will propose the CAI to the Council 
and Parliament any time soon. As long as China’s 
countersanctions	against	EU	officials	and	entities	are	in	
place,	the	agreement	should	not	be	signed	and	ratified.	
However, if these diplomatic tensions cool down, the EU 
must fully leverage the CAI (and its trade and investment 
powers more generally) to address the human rights 
and forced labour issues in China. This could be done by 
requesting	additional	commitments	on,	for	example,	the	
ratification	of	the	fundamental	ILO	Conventions	in	an	
additional protocol or roadmap, or the development of 
clear	pre-signature	and/or	ratification	commitments.30 
As it is unlikely that China will engage constructively on 
these issues, the EU should deploy its new or envisaged 
autonomous TSD tools, such as on due diligence and 
forced labour, in parallel.
Admittedly, the EU would be sending a mixed message 
to Beijing with this approach, by committing to open 
investment relations while also putting into place  
policy instruments that curb and regulate unfair  
Chinese trade and investment practices. Nevertheless,  
it would be completely in line with its new credo of open 
strategic autonomy.
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